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A SIMPLE AXIOMATICS OF DYNAMIC PLAY IN REPEATED GAMES†
LAURENT MATHEVET∗
ABSTRACT. This paper proposes an axiomatic approach to study two-player infinitely re-
peated games. A solution is a correspondence that maps the set of stage games into the set
of infinite sequences of action profiles. We suggest that a solution should satisfy two simple
axioms: individual rationality and collective intelligence. The paper has three main results.
First, we provide a classification of all repeated games into families, based on the strength
of the requirement imposed by the axiom of collective intelligence. Second, we characterize
our solution as well as the solution payoffs in all repeated games. We illustrate our charac-
terizations on several games for which we compare our solution payoffs to the equilibrium
payoff set of Abreu and Rubinstein (1988). At last, we develop two models of players’ behav-
ior that satisfy our axioms. The first model is a refinement of subgame-perfection, known as
renegotiation proofness, and the second is an aspiration-based learning model.
Keywords: Axiomatic approach, repeated games, classification of games, learning, renegotia-
tion.
JEL Classification: C71, C72, C73.
I INTRODUCTION
What may be reasonable to observe in a repeated interaction? Equilibrium analyses of
repeated interactions propose variants of Nash or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Non-
equilibrium analyses typically propose learning models in which players follow various be-
havioral rules (e.g. Kalai and Lehrer (1993) and Fudenberg and Levine (1998)). Both classes
of analysis deliver paths of play or distributions on paths of play. Rather than starting with
Date: January 17, 2012.
†Special thanks are due to Philippe Solal, Max Stinchcombe and Tom Wiseman for many discussions and
suggestions. I also wish to thank Matthias Blonski, David Frank, Drew Fudenberg, Sahotra Sarkar and Dale
Stahl for their helpful comments.
∗Dept. of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station, C3100, Austin, TX 78712, U.S.A.;
lmath@mail.utexas.edu.
1
a model of behavior and deriving what will be observed, this paper formulates an answer to
the original question in terms of axioms that the dynamic paths should satisfy.1
This paper proposes an axiomatic approach to study two-player infinitely repeated games.
A repeated game is an infinite sequence of repetitions of a stage game. A solution is a de-
scription of the sequences of play that can arise in a repeated game given its stage game.
In technical terms, a solution is a correspondence that maps the set of stage games into
the set of infinite sequences of action profiles. The case of infinitely patient players and
the discounted case are treated separately. In both cases, we suggest that a solution should
satisfy two simple axioms.2 Our first axiom captures a basic notion of individual rational-
ity. A solution should exclude all sequences for which a player receives a strictly smaller
payoff than her maxmin level. In many instances, this axiom is uncontroversial, because
all players should be able to secure this minimal payoff. Most equilibrium concepts satisfy
it. Our central axiom captures a notion of collective intelligence. We say that a sequence
demonstrates that the players could make themselves strictly better off if it contains a cyclic
subsequence that Pareto improves on the sequence. The collective intelligence axiom is that
we should not observe dynamic paths of play that demonstrate that the players could make
themselves strictly better off. Most learning models satisfy this axiom in certain games.
The departure of our approach from the standard methodology confers on it different
virtues. Traditionally, the analyst presupposes a behavior for the players through an equi-
librium concept or learning dynamics, and this behavior produces sequences of play. Our
approach takes the sequences of play as starting point, which has several benefits. First,
our axioms contain enough information to provide a classification of all repeated games ac-
cording to the restrictiveness of our theory. This classification helps delineate the domain of
applicability of our theory. Second, this approach has an advantage at the characterization
stage, because the axioms apply directly to the sequences of play and not to the behaviors
that produce them. Finally, it fosters a unifying view of repeated games. In dominance
solvable games, for example, non-equilibrium theory often predicts a unique outcome, while
1This is similar in spirit to the difference between preference-based demand theory and revealed preference
analysis. In the latter, the analyst formulates axioms on observables, i.e. on the consumer’s choices.
2The following version of the axioms corresponds to infinitely patient players. Weaker versions are provided
for the discounted case.
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equilibrium theory often predicts an extreme form of multiplicity. The axiomatic method
help reconcile both sides by grouping theories according to their observable properties.
Among the main results, we classify all repeated games into families, based on the strength
of the requirement imposed by the axiom of collective intelligence. For each game, it allows
to appreciate the reasonableness of the axiom — under a certain criterion. In game theory,
most equilibrium and non-equilibrium theories are silent about the games to which they are
more likely to apply. By default, the assumptions that the analyst makes about players seem
to apply equally to all games. For example, the statement that the structure of the game and
the players’ rationality are common knowledge is assumed to hold for all games.3 Similarly,
the statement that players use Bayesian learning or adaptive dynamics is assumed to hold
for all games. This — involuntary or deliberate — form of universality is appealing, but
it makes it difficult to appreciate whether a particular theory is more plausible in certain
games. Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p.8) express a related concern: “although classical game
theory offers a number of alternative solution concepts for cooperative games, it fails to pro-
vide a clear criterion as to which solution concept is to be employed in analyzing any real-
life social situation.” In our approach, the axiom of collective intelligence contains enough
information to suggest a natural criterion to develop a classification of games. Precisely,
each repeated game belongs to a family Fn for some n ∈N\{0}, and collective intelligence is
weaker in Fn than in Fn+1. Thus, the characterizations are more reasonable for games in
Fn than in Fn+1. Our classification criterion will also be used for a given game (instead of
across games) to classify the payoff areas where the axiom is more likely to hold.
We continue the analysis by characterizing the solution, i.e. the set of sequences of play
that satisfy our axioms, in all repeated games. This result leads to a complete characteriza-
tion of the solution payoffs. The characterizations are simple and general. In the discounted
case, they take an eventual form. In 2×2 games, the solution payoffs are reminiscent of
the equilibrium payoffs of Abreu and Rubinstein (1988), and thus we compare both charac-
terizations in several examples. In Battle of the Sexes, for instance, both characterizations
are the same. Like Abreu and Rubinstein (1988), our results are in sharp contrast with
3For example, the fact that a game is dominance solvable — and thus common knowledge of rationality and
of the structure of the game gives a unique rationalizable equilibrium (see e.g. Brandenburger (1992)) — does
not make it a situation where the common knowledge assumption is more likely to hold.
3
traditional folk theorems (e.g. Aumann and Shapley (1994)) since our solution payoff set is
substantially smaller. This reduction is dramatic for common interest games for which each
player has a strictly dominant strategy and not playing it results in very low payoffs. In
those games, our characterization delivers a unique prediction. This suggests that an ax-
iomatic approach may offer selection arguments to equilibrium analysis (see Blonski et al.
(2011)). In general, the axioms eliminate the Nash equilibria for which an alternative way
of playing the profiles played on the path would benefit both players. In other words, in
those Nash equilibria, each player believes that there is no hope to teach the other player
to respond to a deviation that could be jointly beneficial other than by getting punished,
although the other player plays appropriately against it on the equilibrium path.
So far the results characterize the solution as well as the associated payoffs, and the
classification of games gives perspective. However, this does not explain how players may
produce sequences that satisfy the axioms. This leads to our final contribution.
We provide two models of players’ behavior that support our axioms. The first model is
a refinement of subgame perfection, known as renegotiation proofness (Farrell and Maskin
(1989), Bernheim and Ray (1989)). The idea behind renegotiation proofness is that players
do not want to renegotiate the existing terms of an equilibrium at any point in time. We
show that every such equilibrium generates a sequence of play that satisfies the axioms.
Many definitions of renegotiation-proofness are available in the literature, ranging from a
weak requirement (e.g. Farrell and Maskin (1989)) to a strong requirement (e.g. Ray (1994)).
Our definition is intermediate. Our second model is an aspiration-based learning model. In
every period, each player has an implicit aspiration level. If a player’s current average
payoff, over the recent past, does not meet her aspiration, then she switches with some
probability to another course of actions. This process produces the desired sequences with
probability one, at least when players consider increasingly long past histories. The result
re-emphasizes the game classification.
The axiomatic method in economics and the literature on repeated games have led to more
achievements than a literature review can cover. We refer the reader to standard texts,
such as Thomson (2001) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006). To the best of our knowledge,
the axiomatic method has rarely been used in repeated games, so it is hoped to provide
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new perspectives. A recent paper by Blonski et al. (2011) uses an axiomatic method for
equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. They define a solution
as a subset of the (stage game) payoffs and discount factors for which some cooperation
should be expected on the path. Their axioms nicely characterize a unique solution. Earlier
contributions used an axiomatic approach in extensive form games (Abreu and Pearce (1984)
and Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) to study the stability of Nash equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the repeated game model in the next sec-
tion. Section III introduces the axiomatic approach. Section IV provides the classification
of games. Section V contains the characterizations and the examples. Section VI describes
the model of renegotiation-proofness and states the corresponding result. Section VII gives
learning arguments to support the axioms but we relegate the formal treatment of our learn-
ing model to the appendix. Section VIII extends our results to sophistication constraints and
discounted payoffs. Finally we conclude.
II THE MODEL
Let G = (A1,A2,u1,u2) be a two-person game in normal form. A i is player i’s finite set of
actions and A = A1×A2 is the set of action profiles. Define u i : A→R to be player i’s payoff
function. Let
Π(G)= {π ∈R2 : ∃a ∈ A s.t. π= (u1(a),u2(a))}
be the set of pure payoff vectors in G. Denote by Co(X ) the convex hull of X ⊂R2. The set of
feasible payoffs in G is Co(Π(G)). Player i’s maxmin payoff is
ui(G)=max
ai∈A i
min
a j∈A j
u i(ai,a j).
A maxmin action for player i is any action ai such that mina j∈A j u i(ai,a j) = ui(G). Let
u(G)= (u1(G),u2(G)) be the maxmin payoff vector. A payoff vector π is individually rational
if πi ≥ ui(G) for all i. The set of individually rational payoffs is
Π
IR(G)= {π ∈Co(Π(G)) :π1 ≥ u1(G) and π2 ≥ u2(G)}.
The repeated game with stage game G consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of
G at discrete time periods t = 1,2, . . . At period t, the players make simultaneous moves,
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denoted by at
i
∈ A i, that become common knowledge (forever). The history of play up to
time t, denoted by ht, is the sequence of action profiles ht = (a
1, . . . ,at). Let Ht be the set of
histories of length t and let H =∪Ht be the set of all (finite) histories.
A repeated game strategy for player i is a function σi :H→ A i that maps each history to
an action in A i. Starting from any history ht ∈ Ht, the continuation game is the infinitely
repeated game that begins in period t. For any strategy profile σ, player i’s continuation
strategy induced by ht, denoted σi|ht , is given by σi|ht (h)=σi(hth) for all h ∈H, where hth
is the concatenation of history ht followed by history h.
Repeated game payoffs are determined by the inferior limit of means. We study dis-
counted payoffs in Section VIII. Let S(G)= A∞ be the set of all infinite sequences of play in
the repeated game with stage game G. For notational ease, we will use S to refer to S(G)
when there is no confusion. An element s ∈ S is written as s = (s1, s2, . . .). For s ∈ S, player
i’s payoff is given by
πi(s)= liminf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
u i(s
t).
A pair of strategies σ = (σ1,σ2) produces a sequence of play a(σ) ∈ S. Thus, each player i
receives utility πi(a(σ)) from strategy profile σ. For any π,π
′ ∈R2, π≫π′ means π1 >π
′
1
and
π2 >π
′
2
, i.e. π (strictly) Pareto dominates π′. Notation π> π′ means that π1 ≥π
′
1
and π2 ≥ π
′
2
and at least one inequality holds strictly, i.e. π weakly Pareto dominates π. Let
P (X )= {π ∈ X : Øx ∈ X s.t. x≫π}
be the set of (weakly) Pareto efficient elements in X relative to X .
III THE AXIOMATIC APPROACH
Preliminaries
We study the class of two-player infinitely repeated games with finite stage games. Let G
be the set of all (finite two-person) stage games. A solution S is a function that assigns to
each stage game G ∈G a subset S (G)⊂ S(G). We think of S (G) as a description of the set
of infinite sequences that can arise in the repeated game with stage game G.
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Before stating our axioms, we define the notion of cycle. A sequence s ∈ S has a cycle if
there exist T and ℓ such that st = st+ℓ for all t≥ T and there is no ℓ′ < ℓ for which st = st+ℓ
′
for all t≥ T. The length ℓ of a cycle is equal to the number of profiles that form the cycle. A
sequence with a cycle is called a cyclic sequence. These sequences play an important role in
repeated games. They appear in folk theorems (Aumann and Shapley (1994)). They emerge
naturally in repeated games with boundedly rational players who use automaton strategies
(Abreu and Rubinstein (1988); see the appendix). Automata are sometimes interpreted as
mental systems with psychological states (Compte and Postlewaite (2010)). From this point
of view, a cycle captures a notion of joint abilities of the players. We also know from Kalai
and Stanford (1988) that all subgame perfect equilibria can be approximated by profiles that
generate cyclic sequences. Finally, our characterization results are unchanged if we adopt a
more general definition of cycle that includes the above as a special case.
The Axioms
We provide two simple axioms that capture sensible properties of a solution. Section VIII
contains the version of the axioms for the discounted case.
Axiom 1. (Individual Rationality) For any stage game G ∈G , if s ∈ S(G) is such that πi(s)<
ui(G) for some player i, then s ∉S (G).
This axiom eliminates all sequences for which there exists a player whose dynamic payoff
is strictly lower than her maxmin level. In many situations, Axiom 1 should be uncontro-
versial. If we restrict attention to cyclic sequences, then any player prefers to switch to her
maxmin action forever rather than obtaining the sequence s described in the axiom. In-
deed, a player can, at any time, decide to play her maxmin action forever. For all periods
that follow this choice, she will receive per-period payoffs that weakly exceed ui(G), hence
her dynamic payoff will be weakly larger than ui(G).
For arbitrary sequences, the axiom deserves further explanation. Let ǫ ∈ (0,1), and con-
sider a game where u = 3(1−ǫ) is the payoff of some action profile and u1(G)= 1. Let s be a
sequence that gives the following payoffs to player 1:
(1) u,u,0,0,0,0,u,u,u,u,u,u,u,u, . . .
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In (1), every finite string of u’s (0’s) is followed by twice as many 0’s (u’s). It is easy to see
that limT→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1 u1(s
t) does not exist and π1(s)=
1
3
u< u1(G). Axiom 1 says that the solu-
tion should exclude sequence s as a possible outcome. One argument is that player 1 may
induce a sequence that she prefers to s by playing her maxmin action. Given two arbitrary
sequences, in particular without cycle, it is not obvious to define preferences between them
based on payoffs. Under the limit-of-means criterion (Aumann and Shapley (1994)), a player
prefers s′ to s′′ if liminf(1/T)
∑
u i(s
′t)≥ limsup(1/T)
∑
u i(s
′′ t). Another criterion may express
a preference for stable payoffs: s′ is strictly preferred to s′′ whenever u i(s
′t)>πi(s
′′) for all t
large enough. Under this criterion, each player prefers a stable payoff flow to a more chaotic
path that may, at times, pay more. Each player can then induce a sequence that she prefers
to s by switching to her maxmin action.
We now present our second axiom.
Axiom 2. (Collective Intelligence) For any stage game G ∈G , if s ∈ S(G) has a cyclic subse-
quence s′ such that π(s′)≫π(s), then s ∉S (G).4
One reading of this axiom is that if a sequence of play contains an alternative “scenario”
(i.e. a subsequence) that benefits both players, then they should find it and the original
sequence should not materialize. s′ is required to be cyclic to exclude alternative scenarios
of extreme complexity; since they may be much more complex than the sequence from which
they are extracted, it is unclear that players may find them (see Section IV).
Let us make a key observation: a sequence s cannot be eliminated by using cycles made
of actions that do not appear in s or that appear only finitely often in s. This means that
Axiom 2 applies if a sequence of play carries in itself forever an alternative way of playing
that benefits both players. The first part of the key observation follows from the definition of
a subsequence. All elements of s′ are contained in s, hence players do not play new profiles
in s′. What explains π(s′)≫ π(s) is that s adds poor choices in between the elements of s′;
see the proposition below. The second part of the observation follows from the definition of
π as a limit of means. If an element only appears finitely many times in a sequence, then it
does not affect the payoffs. Thus, if there were action profiles in s yielding high payoffs for
both players, and if they were only played finitely many times in s, then they could only be
4The discounted-payoff analog of our axioms is given in Section VIII.
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played finitely many times in s′. As a result, π(s′)≫ π(s) could not hold. For π(s′)≫ π(s) to
hold, s must feature “good” profiles played infinitely many times, yet these profiles are not
given a more prominent part of the interaction.
Most learning models lead to satisfy collective intelligence in certain games (Section VII).
Therefore, denying the axiom as a whole contradicts these models. For example, all (finite-
time) convergent learning dynamics satisfy collective intelligence, because all subsequences
of a convergent sequence give the same dynamic payoffs as the sequence. In (finite) domi-
nance solvable games, where most learning models predict convergence, the acceptance of
these models is tied to the acceptance of the axiom.
The importance of the experimental literature in repeated games5 raises the question:
is collective intelligence corroborated by experiments? The question actually applies to the
discounted-payoff version of the axiom. A rigorous answer is beyond the scope of this paper.
We will simply say that some data are encouraging, at least in certain games. In Arifovic
et al. (2006), for example, many pairs of subjects end up playing the efficient equilibrium in
Chicken and Stag Hunt, and alternating between the equilibria in Battle of the Sexes, and
playing a seemingly convergent path, cooperative or not, in the Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Before concluding this section, we reformulate the axiom in terms of inferior choices. The
next proposition shows that the existence of an improving subsequence is equivalent to the
existence of an inferior subsequence. Interpreted along these lines, Axiom 2 requires players
to eventually abandon inferior choices.
Proposition 1. A cyclic sequence s has a cyclic subsequence s′ such that π(s′)≫π(s), if and
only if, it has a cyclic subsequence s′′ such that π(s′′)≪π(s).
Proofs omitted in the main text are relegated to the appendix.
Although collective intelligence implies some cooperation between the players along cer-
tain sequences, it is compatible with non-cooperative game theory. Indeed, collective intel-
ligence only deals with joint improvements that come from within a sequence. Therefore,
the axiom allows for total cooperation failure, which occurs when players revert to their
5The recent literature includes, among others, Dal Bo (2005), Arifovic et al. (2006), Duffy and Ochs (2009),
Blonski et al. (2011), and Dal Bo and Frechette (2011). For a more comprehensive literature review, especially
of the earlier literature (e.g. Roth and Murnighan (1978), Holt (1985), etc), we refer the reader to the recent
experimental papers.
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maxmin action forever. Likewise, the axiom allows for the existence of punishments, even if
they harm both players. However, phases of mutually harmful behaviors cannot co-exist in-
definitely with instances of cooperation. In that case, cooperation would take over, possibly
after an arbitrary long time, i.e. after arbitrarily many cooperation failures or punishments.
This line of reasoning is defended by Axelrod (1984)’s works on the emergence of coopera-
tion in non-cooperative settings. Overall, our axiom has a flavor of cooperative competition
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1999)).
We will provide a formal defense of our axioms in later sections. For any game G, let
C (G) be the set of sequences that satisfy the axioms, i.e. all sequences s that do not have
any cyclic subsequence s′ such that π(s′)≫π(s) and for which πi(s)≥ ui(G) for all i.
IV AXIOMS AND COMPLEXITY
In this section, we propose a criterion to assess the reasonableness of collective intelligence
and we use it to classify all stage games, and indirectly all repeated games, into families.
The main hurdle to the axiom lies in the players’ difficulty of noticing and implementing
an improving subsequence. Our criterion is based on the comparison between the complexity
of a sequence and the complexity of some improving subsequence. It seems reasonable to
assume that if players conform to some convention, then they should be able to conform to
simpler conventions that do not add new observations. That is, if players succeed in playing
a cycle, then they should be able to play another cycle of shorter or equal length that uses the
same action profiles. This is especially plausible because, once the players play a cycle, they
will have infinitely many opportunities to observe it, question it, and eventually change
it. Therefore, one of the main reasons why players may not play another cycle, although
it uses the same profiles and benefits both players, must be that it is longer and thereby
requires more sophistication. But suppose that it can never happen. Suppose that any
cyclic sequence s that contains an improving subsequence also contains one, call it s′′, that
is simpler than s, i.e. whose cycle is smaller than that of s.6 Then the axiom should be
rather reasonable, because along s the players will not only experience its cycle arbitrarily
6A subsequence could be more complex, i.e. have a longer cycle, than the sequence from which it is extracted.
For example, s= (a,b,a,b, . . .) has a cycle of length 2 and s′ = (a,b,b,a,b,b, . . .), constructed by removing one a
out of two from s, has a cycle of length 3.
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many times, allowing them to detect s′′, but a joint improvement only requires the players
to implement a simpler cycle than their current one. To summarize, in these situations, they
should find an improving subsequence. The main result shows that there are games that
satisfy this property. Unfortunately, for some games, if an improving subsequence exists,
then it may require a longer cycle than the original sequence; thus, the players may never
reach the level of sophistication necessary to improve themselves. Yet the axiom may still
hold, depending on the capabilities that the players gain over time. After all, the players
have an infinite horizon to learn to coordinate on increasingly complex cycles.
Our main result classifies stage games into families. In each family, an improving subse-
quence cannot exceed a certain complexity in comparison to the original sequence.
Defining Family Fn
This section presents the formal definition of family Fn as well as technical material. The
next section contains the main result. Some readers may prefer reading the next section
and its main result before covering the technicalities.
A triangle is a convex set ∆=Co({u1,u2,u3}) where u1,u2 and u3 are three non-collinear
vectors in Π(G),7 called vertices. Let V (∆) be the set of vertices of ∆. Let N (∆)= {u ∈V (∆) :
u ∈P (V (∆))} be the set of Pareto undominated vertices within V (∆). Let T (G) be the set of
all triangles in game G.
Given a stage game, the next definition classifies the different areas of the feasible payoffs
into families, and this classification will determine the family to which the game belongs.
Let Q[0,1] be the set of rational numbers between 0 and 1. Given a rational number q, d(q)
denotes its denominator and ν(q) its numerator.
Definition 1. Given G ∈ G , a feasible payoff π is in Uk, k ∈N
∗, if for aany ∆ ∈T (G) such
that π ∈∆ and |N (∆)| = 3, ∆ can be written as Co({u1,u2,u3}) such that, for some q ∈Q[0,1],
either (u2−u1)+q(u2−u3)≫ 0 and d(q)≤ k, or (u1−u2)+q(u3−u2)≫ 0 and d(q)+ν(q)≤ k.8
7Three points x, y, z ∈R2 are collinear if
y2−x2
y1−x1
=
z2−x2
z1−x1
.
8The requirement q ∈ [0,1] is inconsequential because we can relabel the vertices of a triangle: if (u2−u1)+
2(u2−u3)≫ 0, then 1
2
(u2−u1)+(u2−u3)≫ 0, and thus, exchanging the labels of u1 and u3, we have (u2−u1)+
1
2
(u2−u3)≫ 0.
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A feasible payoff profile is in Uk if every triangle that contains it, and whose vertices are
pairwise Pareto unordered, can be written such that a movement along one of its edges,
followed by a fraction q of a movement along another, leads to a Pareto improvement, where
q is a rational number satisfying certain properties with respect to k. By convention, if there
is no ∆ containing π such that |N (∆)| = 3, then π ∈U1. Our main definition is the following.
Definition 2. A game G is in family Fn if for every π ∈Co(Π(G)), π ∈∪
n
k=1
Uk.
A game is in family Fn if any feasible payoff is in Uk for some k ≤ n. Every stage game
is in Fn for some n ≥ 1. Let us illustrate the definition in the Prisoners’ Dilemma with the
payoffs given in Figure II. There are four possible triangles, as shown in the next figure.
1 2 3
1
2
3
∏2
∏1
u3
u2
u1
u3
1 2 3
1
2
3
∏2
∏1
u1
pi
pi’
U1
U2
u2
u2
u3
u2u1
u2u3
u3u2
u2u1
FIGURE I. Triangles in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
For every triangle ∆ in the left-hand side panel, |N (∆)| = 2 and thus these triangles
are not subject to the requirement of Definition 1. Triangles in the right-hand side panel,
however, are subject to the requirement, because |N (∆)| = 3. In the bottom triangle, a
movement along vector (u1−u2)+(u3−u2), where uℓ−uk =
−−−→
ukuℓ, gives a Pareto improvement
over any π. Therefore, q= 1 and d(q)+ν(q)= 2. In the top triangle, a movement along vector
(u2−u1)+ (u2−u3) gives a Pareto improvement over any π′. Again, q = 1 and hence d(q)=
1. Putting these observations together, we obtain G ∈ F2. The reason why the Prisoners’
Dilemma is in F2 is intuitive. In the bottom triangle (right panel), a Pareto improvement
requires to re-allocate the weight from u2 onto two different profiles, which may require an
increased level of coordination from the players.
We show that Battle of the Sexes and Chicken are in F1. Consider Figure III in Section
V. There is only one triangle and it satisfies |N (∆)| = 2. Therefore Battle of the Sexes is in
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F1. In Chicken, Figure IV in Section V, only one triangle satisfies |N (∆)| = 3, and we can
label its vertices so that (u2−u1)+ (u2−u3)≫ 0. Therefore, Chicken is in F1.
Complexity and Classification of Games
The complexity of a (cyclic) sequence of play is measured by the length of its cycle. Under
automaton strategies, this measure gives a limit on the number of states that a pair of
automata can have in order to generate the desired sequence. Alternatively, if a cycle results
from an agreement by the players to correlate their actions via a public signaling device,9
then the complexity measure gives an indication on the complexity of the device. Given a
cyclic sequence s, say that a sequence s′′ is at most n times more complex than s if s′′ has
a cycle whose length is smaller than or equal to n times the length of the cycle of s. When
n= 1, sequence s′′ is said to be simpler than s.
We first state and discuss our result, and then sketch the intuition of the proof.
Proposition 2. For any game G ∈Fn, if sequence s has a cycle and if it contains a subse-
quence s′ such that π(s′)≫ π(s), then there is a subsequence s′′ of s such that s′′ is at most
n times more complex than s and π(s′′)≫π(s).
If an improving subsequence exists, then there must be one whose complexity cannot ex-
ceed a certain limit compared to the original sequence. In virtue of this proposition, families
Fn indicate how plausible it is that the players implement a jointly improving scenario. As n
increases, it becomes less plausible, because all improving subsequences may be much more
complex than what there is evidence of the players’ capability (in s). That said, the axiom
may continue to hold for large n if the players gain sophistication over time. The proposition
implies that if we reject the axiom for G ∈Fn, then we accept the fact that two players can
play a cycle of length ℓ forever, without ever realizing that a (sub)cycle of length at most
nℓ would give them both strictly higher payoffs, or without ever being able to implement
it. Thus, collective intelligence is particularly compelling in F1, because if an improving
subsequence exists, then there must also be a simpler one than the original sequence.
9Take an urn with balls of different colors. When a ball is publicly drawn, each player behaves according to
the color. The number of balls, which indicates the complexity of the device, is the length of the cycle.
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We now sketch the intuition behind the proposition. Consider a sequence with cycle
{(C,D)(C,C)(D,C)} in the Prisoners’ Dilemma. A look at Figure I shows that the result-
ing payoffs are π′. If players eventually modified the cycle by replacing (D,C) and (C,D) by
(C,C), then their payoffs would change from 1
3
(u1+u2+u3) to
(2)
1
3
(u1+u2+u3+ (u2−u1)+ (u2−u3))= u2.
Figure I shows that a movement along vector
−−−→
u1u2+
−−−→
u3u2, where
−−−→
ukuℓ = uℓ− uk, gives a
Pareto improvement from π′. The modification in (2) is equivalent to a change in payoffs
along 1
3
(
−−−→
u1u2+
−−−→
u3u2), thus it must be a Pareto improvement. In other words, any subse-
quence that eventually selects (C,C) only from the above cycle is simpler than and improves
on the starting sequence. More generally, when players reach a cycle whose associated pay-
offs lie in triangle ∆, each vertex of ∆ corresponds to the payoffs of an action profile from the
cycle. Definition 1 identifies the different areas from the feasible payoff set that lend them-
selves to Pareto improvements by moving along vectors, where these vectorial movements
represent substitutions between the elements of the cycle.10
We end this section with two remarks:
Instead of classifying games into families, we could classify areas of the feasible payoffs
for a given game; this is Definition 1. The main interest is to develop a theory subject to
sophistication constraints. For example, an analyst may be studying a game in F2, while
she only believes that the players can implement an improving subsequence if it is simpler
than the starting sequence. This is analyzeed in Section VIII.
The definition of Fn imposes strong conditions. Albeit not necessary, these conditions
seem to be minimally sufficient to establish Proposition 2. Consider the Prisoners’ Dilemma
with utilities u(D,D) = (1
2
, 1
2
), u(C,D) = (−1,3), u(D,C) = (3,−1), and u(C,C) = (2,2). This
game is in F2. Take a sequence whose cycle (of length 7) has one (D,D), four (C,D)’s and
two (D,C)’s. This sequence admits no improving subsequence with a cycle of length ℓ ≤ 7,
confirming G ∉F1. The shortest subcycle that dominates the above has length 11.
10For example, if |N (∆)| = 3 and (u2−u1)+ (u2−u3)≫ 0, then players should drop some weight allocated to
(profiles giving) u1 and u3 and transfer it onto u2.
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V CHARACTERIZATIONS
In this section, we characterize our solution, i.e. the set of sequences that are compatible
with our axioms, in all repeated games. We use this result to completely characterize the
solution payoffs. Our results are illustrated on several examples. In 2×2 games, our solution
payoffs are reminiscent of the basic structure of the equilibrium payoff set of Abreu and
Rubinstein (1988). Both characterizations are compared in the examples.
While studying our characterizations, it is important to keep in mind the classification of
games, as the characterizations may be more reasonable in certain games than others.
Before proceeding to the results, we introduce several definitions. The line segment be-
tween any uk and uℓ in Π(G) (not necessarily different) is defined as ukuℓ =Co({uk,uℓ}). Let
L(G) be the set of all segments in game G with generic element g. For any sequence s ∈ S,
the recurrent payoff set is defined as
R(s)= {u ∈Π(G) : ∃a ∈ A s.t. u= u(a) and (∀T ∈N)(∃t≥T) s.t. st = a}.
Each sequence s induces an infinite sequence of payoffs and R(s) is the set of payoffs that
appear infinitely many times in that sequence.11
The Results
Two notions play a central role in our characterization results, individual rationality and
internal efficiency.
Definition 3. A sequence s is individually rational if πi(s)≥ ui for all i.
Definition 4. A sequence s is internally efficient if π(s) ∈P (Co(R(s))).
The first notion is obvious. The second notion is interesting for its normative and positive
content. A sequence is internally efficient if it generates a payoff vector that lies on the
weak-Pareto frontier of (the convex hull of) its own set of recurrent payoffs. It is socially de-
sirable that players generate the largest surplus from their interaction. Nonetheless, it may
be too demanding to assume Pareto efficiency, because it does not take into account players’
11This interpretation of R(s) is accurate, because A is finite. If A were infinite, then it could be that a payoff
vector appears infinitely many times in s and yet is not in R(s).
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capabilities. They may be unable to cooperate to generate the maximal surplus. They may
not even be aware of the actions to take to produce the maximal surplus. Internal efficiency,
however, requires that among the recurrent profiles, there cannot be a strict Pareto improv-
ing arrangement. If players are sufficiently patient and if they observe the same profiles
forever, then they may arrive at an efficient arrangement of these profiles. The concept of
internal efficiency provides an answer to the criticisms of the adaptive learning literature,
according to which adaptive players can play a repeated pattern forever without becoming
aware of it, i.e. without noticing the (joint) opportunities for profit (e.g. Sonsino (1997)).
Theorem 1. A solution S satisfies Axioms 1 and 2, if and only if, S (G) is a subset of the
set of internally efficient and individually rational sequences for all G ∈G .
Proof. Suppose that solution S satisfies the axioms.
Step 1. Internal efficiency. Take anyG and any sequence s ∈S (G). For every π ∈Co(R(s)),
there is a rational convex combination
∑
k u
kαk, with {u
k}⊂ R(s) and {αk}⊂Q, that is arbi-
trarily close to π. For every such rational convex combination, we can build a cyclic sequence
s′ whose elements {s
′t} are all in R(s) and such that π(s′) =
∑
k u
kαk. By construction, s
′ is
a subsequence of s. By way of contradiction, suppose that sequence s is not internally ef-
ficient, i.e. π(s) ∉ P (Co(R(s))). There are two possible cases: either (i) π(s) ∉ Co(R(s)) or
(ii) π(s) ∈Co(R(s)). In case (i), it must be that sequence {zT }, where zT = 1
T
∑T
t=1 u(s
t), does
not converge. Since the payoffs are given by liminf zT , there exists π ∈ Co(R(s)) such that
π≫π(s). This fact obviously holds in case (ii). From the previous argument, there is a ratio-
nal convex combination of elements of R(s) that is arbitrarily close to π, and thus there is a
cyclic subsequence s′ of s such that π(s′)≫π(s). Axiom 2 is violated. This is a contradiction.
Step 2. Individual rationality. This part follows immediately.
Suppose now that S (G) is a subset of the set of internally efficient and individually rational
sequences for all G. Take any G and any sequence s ∈S (G). Then π(s) ∈P (Co(R(s))). For
every cyclic subsequence s′ of s, π(s′) ∈Co(R(s)). Thus there cannot be a subsequence s′ of s
such that π(s′)≫ π(s), for otherwise there would be a convex combination from R(s) that is
a Pareto improvement on π(s). Therefore, Axiom 2 holds. Axiom 1 is trivially satisfied. 
If players can implement improving subsequences, then a sequence that survives the
axiom of collective intelligence cannot offer strict Pareto-improvement opportunities within
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its recurrent payoffs, and thus it must be internally efficient. We now use Theorem 1 to
derive a characterization of the solution payoffs in all repeated games.
Theorem 2. For every game G ∈G , π(C (G)) is dense in (∪g∈L(G)P (g))∩Π
IR(G).
In every repeated game, the solution payoffs must be individually rational and lie on
the Pareto frontier of a segment formed by some feasible payoffs. This representation as
a union of segments dramatically reduces the set of possible payoffs compared to standard
folk theorems (e.g. Aumann and Shapley (1994)).
The axioms contain additional information omitted by our characterizations. The axioms
produce stable sequences in most games, where stability means convergence of the average
payoffs. This is the next result.
Definition 5. A sequence s is payoff-convergent if limT→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1 u(st) exists.
In a payoff convergent sequence, although players may not play a cycle, it is as if they did
from a payoff perspective, because the limit of means exists. The trajectory of play along
such sequences is not too chaotic. For example, it could be generated by players who play a
cycle and depart from it from time to time, but these departures have vanishing frequencies.
In the axioms, the players express a form of preference for stability and recurrence. In
particular, collective intelligence suggests an environment where players prefer a sequence
to another if the former is cyclic and pays more, which justifies discarding a sequence with
an improving cyclic subsequence. The next result is a manifestation of this intuition, as
chaotic sequences will be discarded in most games.
Let G ′ be the family of stage games for which no two distinct action profiles yield either
player the same payoff. That is, for games in G ′, if u i(a)= u i(a
′), then a= a′. This condition
holds for almost all games.
Proposition 3. For every game G ∈G ′, if a solution S satisfies Axioms 1 and 2, then S (G)
is a subset of the set of payoff-convergent sequences.
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Examples and Uniqueness Result
We demonstrate the conclusions of Theorem 2 on several examples. We also describe a
class of common interest games for which our axioms give a unique prediction. Abreu and
Rubinstein (1988) study infinitely repeated games under bounded rationality and the left
figures represent the Nash equilibrium payoff set of their machine game. The right figures
represent our solution payoffs (i.e. C (G)). The intersection of both figures correspond to the
Nash equilibrium payoffs among boundedly rational and collectively intelligent players. All
the games below are in F1, except the Prisoners’ Dilemma, which is in F2.
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FIGURE II. The Prisoners’ Dilemma
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FIGURE III. Battle of the Sexes
4, 4
0, 05, 2
2, 5
1
2
C
C
D
D
1 2 3
1
2
3
∏2
∏1
1 2 3
1
2
3
∏2
∏1
FIGURE IV. Chicken
Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) insist on the dramatic effect of their structure theorem (The-
orem 1∗, p.1271) on the set of equilibrium payoffs in 2×2 games. In more general games,
the set of equilibrium payoffs of the machine game may lose its representation as a union
of segments, while this continues to hold under our axioms by Theorem 2. For instance, in
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FIGURE V. Stag Hunt
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FIGURE VI. A Two-player Three-action Game
the game of Figure VI, the equilibrium payoff set of the machine game is the same as in the
traditional folk theorem.12
Figures VII and VIII depict two common interest games. Let u∗
i
=maxa∈A u i(a) for i =
1,2. A two-player game is a common interest game if u i(a
′) = u∗
i
for some player i implies
u i(a
′)= u∗
j
for player j. The next proposition identifies a class of common interest games for
which our solution predicts a unique payoff.
4, 4
0, 03, 2
2, 3
1
2
C
C
D
D
1 2 3
1
2
3
∏2
∏1
1 2 3
1
2
3
∏2
∏1
FIGURE VII. A Common Interest Game
12All the convex combinations of payoff vectors (3, 3), (1, 2) and (4, 1) can be supported in equilibrium, because
each vector corresponds to a static Nash equilibrium payoff. Moreover, an equilibrium pair of automata can be
constructed to generate any convex combination of payoff vectors (1, 2), (4, 1) and (0, 0).
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FIGURE VIII. A Common Interest Game
Proposition 4. In game G, if there is π∗ ∈Π(G) such that either (i) π∗≫ u(G) ≥ π for all
π ∈Π(G)\{π∗} and u(G) ∉Π(G), or (ii) π∗ ≥ u(G)≫ π for all π ∈Π(G)\{π∗} and u(G) ∈Π(G)
implies u(G)=π∗, then π(C (G))= {π∗}.
The first condition implies that playing the profile of maxmin actions secures maximal
payoff π∗. In a common interest game where u(G) ≥ π for all π ∈ Π(G)\{π∗}, the players
are bound to experience payoffs below their maxmin level if they do not play their maxmin
actions. Since playing the maxmin actions yields payoffs π∗, we suspect that π∗ should be
the unique outcome of such games. The game in Figure VII violates both conditions of the
proposition and our prediction is not unique. The game in Figure VIII satisfies the first
condition, hence our prediction is unique.
VI AXIOMS AND RENEGOTIATION
The previous sections do not explain how players can produce sequences of play that satisfy
the axioms. In this section, we suggest a theory, known as renegotiation-proofness, that also
clarifies the relationship of our approach with equilibrium analysis.
A standard definition of renegotiation-proofness is due to Farrell and Maskin (1989).13
Players agree ex-ante to play a subgame-perfect equilibrium, but they are able to renego-
tiate the continuation play after every period. In this case, as the authors write, “players
are unlikely to play, or to be deterred by, a proposed continuation equilibrium (on or off
the equilibrium path) that is strictly Pareto dominated by another equilibrium that they
believe is available to them.” Therefore, a subgame-perfect equilibrium σ is renegotiation-
proof if there do not exist continuation equilibria σ|h and σ|h′ such that σ|h (strictly) Pareto
13Bernheim and Ray (1989) independently provided an equivalent definition.
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dominates σ|h′ . This definition imposes restrictions between the equilibrium, σ (i.e. σ|;),
and its continuation profiles. If σ (strictly) Pareto dominates some continuation equilibrium
σ|h, then the previous argument applies. Conversely, if a continuation profile σ|h (strictly)
Pareto dominates equilibrium profile σ, then presumably the players would renegotiate the
equilibrium path and play σ|h instead. Our definition extends the idea of renegotiating the
equilibrium path. To avoid fruitless technical complications, we assume that players use
strategies representable by finite automata (see Section A in appendix). For any sequence
s ∈ S, let
(3) R∗(s)= {a ∈ A : (∀T ∈N)(∃t≥T) s.t. st = a}
be the set of recurrent action profiles in s, and let J(s)= {a ∈ A : ∃t s.t. st = a} be the set of all
profiles played in s.
Definition 6. A subgame-perfect equilibrium σ is renegotiation-proof if (i) there do not exist
continuation equilibria σ|h and σ|h′ of σ such that σ|h strictly Pareto dominates σ|h′ and (ii)
there is no subgame-perfect equilibrium σ′ that strictly Pareto dominates σ and satisfies (i),
R∗(a(σ′))⊂R∗(a(σ)) and ∪hJ(a(σ
′|h))⊂∪hJ(a(σ|h)).
Part (i) is the definition by Farrell and Maskin (1989). Part (ii) reflects our position on
renegotiation: players are able to revise the existing terms of an equilibrium but they cannot
introduce new ones. If players can renegotiate σ in favor of one of its continuations, as
assumed in (i), then they may also renegotiate σ in favor of another equilibrium σ′ that uses
on (and off ) its equilibrium path the same action profiles played on (and off ) the equilibrium
path of σ. The players constantly observe the recurrent action profiles of the path, so they
have infinitely many opportunities to propose an alternative arrangement of these profiles.
For example, if players have been playing the cycle ((C,D)(C,C)(D,C)) in the Prisoners’
Dilemma, eventually they could say: “Why are we repeatedly playing (C,D) and (D,C)?
Why not renegotiate and just play (C,C)?” The requirement of part (ii) applies to off-path
profiles as well. The players cannot enforce their new equilibrium-path arrangement with
profiles that are not played in σ. Therefore, all the continuation profiles of σ′, in particular
off-path, must be played under σ, ∪hJ(a(σ
′|h))⊂∪hJ(a(σ|h)). Another argument in favor of
our definition is that, for games in F1, players may have a double incentive to renegotiate
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according to Definition 6: not only this may increase their payoffs but this may also decrease
their complexity costs.14
Trivially, there is always at least one renegotiation-proof equilibrium. Let a = (a1,a2) be
a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. Define the repeated-game strategy σ∗
i
for player i
that always plays ai for every history. Then σ
∗ = (σ∗
1
,σ∗
2
) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
It has no other continuation equilibrium other than itself, R∗(a(σ))= J(a(σ|h))= {a} for all
h. Any σ′ such that R∗(a(σ′)) ⊂ R∗(a(σ)) cannot Pareto dominate σ, hence it satisfies our
definition. We state our result and return to the existing literature.
Proposition 5. For any stage game G, every renegotiation-proof equilibrium generates a
path of play in C (G) (i.e. it satisfies individual rationality and collective intelligence).
The result relies on the specification of payoffs as limits of means. When a subgame-
perfect equilibrium σ violates collective intelligence, it is possible to build another equilib-
rium σ′ whose path rewards both players more than σ. What is less obvious is that σ′ can
always use some of the continuation profiles of σ as punishments to enforce its equilibrium
path. Although these punishments may be inefficient in the short run, and thus might a pri-
ori violate (i), they are efficient in the long run if the punishment phase only lasts finitely
many periods. This shows that the requirement ∪hJ(a(σ
′|h)) ⊂ ∪hJ(a(σ|h)), which is very
demanding, may become too restrictive for discounted payoffs.15
There are several definitions of renegotiation-proofness in the repeated game literature.
The definition by Farrell and Maskin (1989) imposes a weak requirement, and thus in many
games it does not restrict the set of equilibrium payoffs. In response, stronger definitions
have been provided, for example by Bernheim and Ray (1989) and Ray (1994). In Ray
(1994), the set of equilibrium payoffs consists of singletons and the Pareto frontier. Our
definition is intermediate. The main difference with the stronger definitions is that we
exclude renegotiation towards profiles (hence payoffs) that have not been played under σ.
14In Abreu and Rubinstein (1988), players prefer machines with fewer states (see Section A). If renegotiation
leads to implement a simpler subsequence, then they may obtain larger payoffs and spare states.
15Under discounted payoffs, the result should hold if we restrict attention to a class of equilibria. Consider the
class of games studied in Farrell and Maskin (1989): there are profiles a1,a2 ∈ A such that for all v ∈Co(Π(G))
with vi > ui for all i, we have maxai ui(ai ,a
i
j
)< vi and u j(a
i)> v j for each i. In these games, we could restrict
attention to those equilibria whose punishment phases only use some a1 and a2.
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Since there is no evidence that players can play or are aware of these profiles, we believe
that it can be a sensible choice.
VII AXIOMS AND LEARNING
In this section, we explain how learning behaviors can lead players to produce the desired
sequences.
Observation. If every s ∈S learn(G) has at most two recurrent profiles, |R∗(s)| ≤ 2, whose
payoffs are not weakly Pareto ordered, then S learn satisfies collective intelligence for G.
Most learning models are a solution S learn that satisfies the above condition in certain
games. For example, a solution that only keeps (individually rational and) convergent se-
quences satisfies both axioms, because all subsequences of a convergent sequence give the
same dynamic payoffs as the sequence. In dominance solvable games, most adaptive and
sophisticated learning dynamics converge to the unique equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts
(1990, 1991)). In those games, models of reinforcement learning (Er’ev and Roth (1995)),
pattern recognition (Sonsino (1997)), and Bayesian learning (Fudenberg and Levine (1998))
also predict convergence to the unique equilibrium. In acyclic games, which include coor-
dination games and common interest games, the adaptive learning model with sampling
by Young (1993) predicts a.s. convergence to a strict Nash equilibrium. In games with
strategic complementarities, potential functions, and bandwagon effects, the probabilistic
learning model of Sanchirico (1996) predicts that play will remain almost always in a Nash
equilibrium. If we agree that these learning models provide acceptable predictions — albeit
maybe incomplete since players are often myopic — then the axioms should be acceptable
in certain games.
Furthermore, we propose an aspiration-based learning model inspired from Karandikar
et al. (1998). For the sake of continuity, we develop it in the appendix. Under some assump-
tion, it produces paths of play that satisfy both axioms with probability one. This offers
an (non-equilibrium) alternative to renegotiation proofness. The contribution is partly con-
ceptual, because our notion of aspiration differs from the existing ones. Besides, the model
re-emphasizes the dichotomy between families F1 and {Fn}n≥2. In {Fn}n≥2, the process
only satisfies collective intelligence if evolution is very slow and the memory size very large.
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This allows players to exploit past information to eliminate improving subsequences. In
contrast, for games in F1, evolution can be fast, and the memory limited, yet the path of
play will satisfy the axioms with probability one.
VIII EXTENSIONS
Sophistication Constraint
An analyst may have some opinion about the players’ ability to detect and implement an
improving subsequence. The analyst may believe that an improving subsequence can be
found (by the players) only if it is no more than K < n times more complex than the starting
sequence, where K is a subjective bound. Nevertheless, the analyst may be studying a game
in Fn. How can we study this scenario?
We model this situation by imposing an alternative version of Axiom 2:
Axiom 3. For any stage game G ∈ G , if s ∈ S has a cyclic subsequence s′ such that π(s′)≫
π(s), and if π(s) ∈∪k≤KUk, then s ∉S (G).
By virtue of Proposition 2, this axiom has the desired implication: if sequence s has a cycle
and contains a subsequence s′ such that π(s′)≫ π(s), and if π(s) ∈ ∪k≤KUk, then there is a
subsequence s′′ of s such that s′′ is at most K times more complex than s and π(s′′)≫π(s).
We can easily modify our characterization theorems to apply them to this situation. The-
orem 1 becomes: a solution S satisfies Axioms 1 and 3, if and only if, S (G) is a subset of
the set of individually rational sequences that are also internally efficient whenever their
payoff is in ∪k≤KUk. Quite simply, internal efficiency only applies to those sequences that
are guaranteed to meet the sophistication constraint. Let C K (G) be the set of sequences
that satisfy (i.e. do not violate) Axioms 1 and 3. We have the following result:
Theorem 3. For every game G ∈G , π(C K (G)) is dense in
Π
IR(G)
⋂( ⋃
k>K
Uk
⋃( ⋃
g∈L(G)
P (g)
⋂( ⋃
k≤K
Uk
)))
.
The new axioms and the solution do not say anything about the areas of the feasible
payoffs outside of ∪k≤KUk. In ∪k≤KUk, however, internal efficiency implies that payoffs
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FIGURE IX. Solution-C K payoffs in the Prisoners’ Dilemma for (A) K = 1, and
(B) K ≥ 2.
must lie on segments. The Prisoners’ Dilemma gives a nice illustration. The analyst knows
this game is in F2 but she may have some opinion about K (see Figure IX).
Discounted Payoffs
Part of the repeated game literature is concerned with discounted payoffs. We adapt Axioms
1 and 2 to the discounted case. This gives us long-run characterizations. Cripps et al. (2004)
emphasize the importance of long-run characterizations. First, an analyst may be studying
an on-going relationship whose starting date she does not know. In those cases, long-run
characterizations may provide useful indications about current behavior. Moreover, it is
common to be interested in the limit points of a learning process, or in the steady states of
a model, again directing attention to long-run behaviors.
For a sequence s ∈ S, player i’s (average) discounted payoff is given by
πi(s)=
1−δ
δ
∞∑
t=1
δtu i(s
t)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. Let us analyze the current axioms in this context.
Under discounting, Axioms 1 and 2 do not forgive “errors” in the early rounds of in-
teraction. Take the following sequences from the Prisoners’ Dilemma, {(C,D)(D,D) . . .},
{(D,D)(D,D)(C,C) . . .} and {(C,D)(D,C)(C,C) . . .}. In the first sequence, player 1 cooperates
in period 1 and then both players play D forever. This sequence violates Axiom 1 for all
δ< 1. Player 1 should not have cooperated in the first period. The latter two sequences vio-
late Axiom 2.16 The players coordinate on the cooperative outcome after two periods, which
16For the last sequence, Axiom 2 is violated for all δ> .85.
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is a reasonably good collective outcome. According to the axiom, however, the players should
not have failed to cooperate in the first two periods.
Under discounted payoffs, weaker versions of the axioms should apply to the tail of se-
quences. Our original motivation was concerned with eventual behaviors. Therefore, we
choose to impose axioms on a tail that contains the recurrent profiles, because these profiles
are observed infinitely many times. Recall the definition of recurrent profiles, R∗(s), defined
in (3). For any sequence s ∈ S, let T(s)= {sˆ ∈ S : (∃N ∈N) (∀t ∈N\{0}), sˆt = st+N and sˆt ∈R∗(s)}
be the set of continuations of s that only contain recurrent profiles.
Axiom 4. For any stage game G ∈G , if s ∈ S is such that, for every sˆ ∈ T(s), πi(sˆ)< ui(G) for
some player i, then s ∉S (G).
Axiom 5. For any stage game G ∈ G , if s ∈ S is such that, for every sˆ ∈ T(s), sˆ has a cyclic
subsequence s′ such that π(s′)≫π(sˆ), then s ∉S (G).
Our characterization results, Theorems 1 and 2, eventually apply to each sequence. Pre-
cisely, if Axioms 4 and 5 hold, then s ∈S (G) must eventually become (i.e. some tail sˆ is) in-
dividually rational and internally efficient. The argument goes as follows. For each s, each
payoff in the convex hull of the recurrent set, Co(R(s)), can be generated as the discounted
payoff π(s′) of a subsequence s′ of any sˆ ∈ T(s). The absence of improving subsequence must
imply internal efficiency of the tail of s.
IX CONCLUSION
Most studies of repeated games postulate a behavior for the players via an equilibrium
concept or learning dynamics. While these postulates may not be observable, they lead to
infinite sequences of play that are, in principle, observable.
This paper suggests starting with the infinite sequences of play and imposing axioms on
them. This methodology is similar in spirit to the revealed preference approach of consumer
theory, inasmuch as the primitives of the model are, in principle, observable. Although the
standard repeated game approach gives invaluable insights on strategic and learning be-
haviors, the axiomatic method may bring new perspectives. From the perspective of equilib-
rium theory, it may present valuable selection arguments where folk theorems often predict
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multiplicity. From the perspective of adaptive learning, it may imply a greater sophistica-
tion of the players, especially their awareness of being involved in a repeated game. The
results may unify both views of repeated interactions. In dominance solvable games, for
example, non-equilibrium theory often predicts a unique outcome, while equilibrium theory
often predicts an extreme multiplicity.
This paper has proposed two simple axioms from which a solution follows as well as so-
lution payoffs. Other axioms are likely to be relevant. Fortunately, our axioms are accom-
panied by a classification of games according to which their performance can be evaluated.
This classification identifies families of games in which our theory and its predictions are
more likely to apply than in others. Beyond the particular classification, we believe that the
meaning of it is important. Consider, for example, the theory according to which players play
iteratively undominated strategies. While this theory gives sharp predictions in dominance-
solvable games, it does not mean that dominance-solvable games are games where it is more
likely to apply. In general, game theory has proceeded in a seemingly universal fashion:
many theories are silent about the games to which they are supposed to apply, and by de-
fault they seem to apply equally to all games. This makes it difficult to appreciate whether
a particular theory is more plausible in certain games. Admittedly, our classification is only
one possible classification that makes conceptual sense. Ultimately, the question of clas-
sifying theories according to contexts may be an empirical question. This seems to be an
important topic in game theory.
One obvious direction for future research is experimental testing. The nature of our the-
ory makes it an appropriate candidate. In this respect, our classification of games comes
in handy. A natural starting point is the class F1. One way to proceed is to pursue with
“higher” families, such as F2, etc. Section VIII offers another perspective. Games in {Fn}n≥2
may have payoff regions with the same nice properties as games in F1. We would expect
collective intelligence to hold at least within these regions.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A COMPLEXITY
An automaton is a behavior model composed of finitely many states, transitions between
those states, and an action is played in each state. The definitions below are given for
convenience; see Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) and Kalai and Stanford (1988) for details.
Definition 7. A (finite) automaton Mi for player i is a tuple (Q i,q
1
i
,λi,µi) where Q i ⊆N is
a (finite) set of states; q1
i
∈Q i is the initial state; µi :Q i×A −→Q i is the transition function;
λi :Q i −→ A i is the behavior function.
17
A pair of finite machines M = (M1,M2) induces deterministically a sequence of action pro-
files. The definition implies that this sequence must have a cycle. In Abreu and Rubinstein
(1988), players have preferences over the nature of the automaton. Complexity enters play-
ers’ utility lexicographically, giving priority to payoffs and then breaking ties according to
the number of states (fewer states are preferred).
APPENDIX B ASPIRATION-BASED LEARNING
In every period, each of two satisficing players has an (implicit) individual aspiration level.
If a player’s current payoff is below her aspiration level, then the player is not satisfied, and
she changes her course of actions with some probability. Players’ aspirations evolve in time
and are determined by individual and group-related performance indicators. First, player i’s
aspiration level is always larger than ui(G), for obvious reasons. Second, a player observes
the recent history, and if both she and the other player could have done strictly better, simply
by duplicating some profiles from the recent past and dropping others, then her aspiration
rises above her current average payoff. The player considers that an alternative and jointly-
beneficial play was within reach and yet it did not happen. Therefore the player seeks
improvement.
There are many ways in which aspirations may be defined. In our model, there is a
sense in which players are not as naive (or optimistic) as in earlier models. In Karandikar
17This definition allows a player to react to his own deviations.
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et al. (1998), the future aspiration is a convex combination of current aspiration and current
payoff. Therefore, if the current payoff is high, then a player’s aspiration increases, whether
or not this might be due to a mistake by the other player that cannot be durable. A similar
remark applies to Hart and Mas-Colell (2000). The authors present a no-regret learning
model. Think of regret as a manifestation of unfulfilled aspiration. In that paper, a player
experiences regret at period t, if the action that she played last could have been replaced,
every time that it was played in the past, by another action that would have yielded a higher
average payoff, assuming that other players would have played the same actions. In the
Prisoners’ Dilemma, for example, player 1 experiences regret at history ((C,C), . . ., (C,C)),
because she thinks that action D would have produced ((D,C), (D,C), . . ., (D,C)). This view is
naive, because it does not take into account others’ reactions to these hypothetical changes.
Our model suggests that a player should experience regret for not obtaining larger payoffs
only when doing so was compatible with her opponent also receiving larger payoffs.
The game G is played repeatedly through time t = 1,2, . . . Players only consider the last
K ≥ 3 periods of their interaction. This may be due to memory size or computational
power.18 Abusing notation, player i’s payoff from any a = (a1, . . . ,aK ) is defined as πi(a) =
1
K
∑K
n=1 u i(a
n). Denote the history at time t by a(t)= (at−K+1, . . . ,at).
Definition 8. A sequence of action profiles b = (b1, . . . ,bK ) is an internal improvement on
sequence a= (a1, . . . ,aK ), if bk ∈ {a1, . . . ,aK } for all k= 1, . . .,K and π(b)≫π(a).
An internal improvement on a is a history b that only differs from a in that it duplicates
some profiles from a and drop others, and both players strictly prefer b to a.
We study the following stochastic process. Recall that A = A1× A2 is the set of action
profiles. A state θ is a history of length K . Let AK be the set of states. At each time
t ∈ {K ,2K ,3K , . . .}, a player (say i) who is at state a(t) computes the set of internal improve-
ments on a(t), possibly empty, and then her play over the next K periods is governed by
individual probabilistic transitions. These one-step individual probabilities determine a K -
step joint transition matrix, Q t
θ,θ′
, that represents the probability to have a(t+K )= θ′ given
18The players will compute the image of a correspondence taking the last K-period history as input. There is
a sense in which larger inputs require more computational power.
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a(t)= θ. We specify rules on the joint transition matrices {Q t}. After each rule, we give an
explanation based on individual transitions.
Rule 1. For all t, if u i(a(t)) < ui(G) for some i, then Q
t
a(t),θ
≥ ǫt for some θ such that u(θ) ≥
u(G).
If player i receives strictly lower payoffs than her maxmin at t, then she might play her
maxmin action in the following K periods. Player j does not exclude this event and thus j
might play a best-response to i’s maxmin action. There is a probability of at least ǫt that
both players exceed their maxmin levels K periods later.
Rule 2. For all t, if b is an internal improvement on a(t), then Q t
a(t),b
≥ δt.
For every internal improvement b on a(t) (there are finitely many), each player will play
at t+1 the action prescribed to her by the first profile, b1, with a probability of at least δ
1
2K
t . If
b1 is realized at t+1, which occurs with probability at least δ
1
K
t , then each player interprets
this as a sign that her opponent may be willing to play b. Then each player will play the
action prescribed by b2 with a probability of at least δ
1
2K
t at t+2, and so on. Therefore, given
a(t), there is a probability of at least δt that K periods later the history will be b.
Rule 3. For all t, if u(a(t))≥ u(G) and a(t) has no internal improvement, then Q t
a(t),a(t)
≥µt.
An individually rational state a(t) with no internal improvement is left with probability
at most 1−µt.
For ǫt,δt > 0, we think of this stochastic process as a reduced form of aspiration-based
learning. In every period, each player i has an individual aspiration level exceeding ui(G).
If a player’s payoff does not meet her aspiration, then she switches with some probability
to another course of actions for the next K periods. K periods later, she re-evaluates the
situation. Precisely, either a player does not achieve her maxmin payoff, in which case she
might resort to her maxmin action to secure it (rule 1), or there exist internal improvements
(rule 2). In the latter, both she and her opponent notice that they could have done strictly
better, simply by duplicating profiles from the recent past and dropping others. Therefore,
they may attempt to realize these internal improvements. Rule 3 applies when a player’s
aspiration is met. Before presenting our result, we introduce some notation.
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Assumption 1. Let βnK =min{δnK ,ǫnKδ(n+1)K }. Assume
lim
T→∞
∑
τ≥T
{
βτK
∏
T≤n≤τ−1
(1−βnK )
(∏
ℓ≥τ
µℓK
)}
= 1.19
The term in brackets bounds the probability to reach an individually rational state with-
out internal improvement for the first time at period n, starting in period T, and to stay in
this state hereafter. Let θ∞ = (θ,θ, . . .) be the infinite concatenation of history θ ∈ AK . Define
(4) H(K ,G)= {(at)∞t=1 : there exist T and θ ∈ A
K such that (at)t≥T = θ
∞,
where θ admits no internal improvement and u i(θ)≥ ui(G) for all i}
to be the set of infinite sequences whose cycle (of length K ) is individually rational and has
no internal improvements. The distance between two sets of infinite sequences, S1 and S2,
is given by
dh(S1,S2)=max
{
sup
s1∈S1
inf
s2∈S2
||π(s1)−π(s2)||, sup
s2∈S2
inf
s1∈S1
||π(s1)−π(s2)||
}
,
where || · || is the Euclidean distance. Under metric dh, the distance between two sets of
sequences is the Hausdorff distance between the set of payoffs that they generate.
Proposition 6. If Assumption 1 holds, then for all G ∈G , the adaptive procedure produces
an infinite path in H(K ,G) with probability one, Prob((at)∞
t=1
∈H(K ,G))= 1. If G ∈F1, then
H(K ,G)⊂C (G) for all K . If G ∈Fn with n≥ 2, then limK→∞ dh(H(K ,G),C (G))= 0.
The first part of the result is not surprising. The assumption implies that the probability
to stay in an individually rational state with no internal improvement is 1 in the limit.
In turn, this implies that the probability to reach an individually rational state with no
internal improvement, starting from period T, tends to 1 as T→∞. Therefore, the process
must eventually find and stay in a desired state. This happens, for example, if µt = 1 and
ǫt = δt = ǫ> 0 for all t, as the process is “bounded” by an absorbing Markov chain.
Although the learning model is artificial, it draws an interesting dichotomy between F1
and {Fn}n≥2. To see this, let G ∈ F2 be the Prisoners’ Dilemma and K = 3. History θ =
{(D,D), (C,D), (D,C)} has no internal improvement, yet its infinite concatenation θ∞ violates
19When τ= T, assume
∏
T≤n≤τ−1(1−βnK )= 1.
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Axiom 2 — there is an improving subsequence. As a result, H(3,G) 6⊂ C (G). However, for
games in {Fn}n≥2, collective intelligence tends to be satisfied as K →∞.
20 A large K slows
down the evolution process, since it postpones the next opportunity for revision, and in
addition, it increases the “memory” size. This allows players to exploit past information to
eliminate improving subsequences. In contrast, for games in F1, evolution can be fast and
the memory or computational abilities limited (K small), yet the path of play will satisfy the
axioms with probability 1.
Since Assumption 1 is minimal to satisfy both axioms, the learning model suggests a
“basic plot” so that the play satisfies both axioms. Players can play freely for an arbitrary
amount of time, such as trying to extract as much as possible from the interaction. But
there must be a time from which they are inclined to settle. However, none of them accepts
to settle, i.e. to reproduce the recent history as a cycle, if they think that they can do better.
Each player thinks that she can do better if the recent history admits an internal improve-
ment (rule 2), or if she does not secure her maxmin payoff (rule 1). In all other cases, after
some arbitrarily long time, each player thinks that challenging the current history cannot
lead to a durably better outcome (rule 3).
APPENDIX C PROOFS
Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose that there is a cyclic subsequence s′ of s such that π(s′)≫ π(s). Clearly, this
implies R(s) > 1. If R(s) = 2, then it must be that R(s) = {u,u′} where u≫ u′. To see why,
suppose that it were not the case, i.e. u and u′ are Pareto unranked. Then, sequence s would
yield payoff π(s) ∈P (Co({u,u′})) because it has a cycle. This would violate the existence of
a subsequence s′ with the above properties. As a result, u≫ u′, and if we define s′′ as a
subsequence that only plays u′, then it satisfies π(s′′)≪ π(s). Given that s has a cycle, if
R(s) contains at least three non-collinear points (otherwise the previous argument would
apply),21 then π(s) lies in the interior of Co(R(s)). Therefore there must be a rational convex
20The process is parameterized by time t and step size K , {aK (t)}. Our analysis studies limT→∞ limK→∞aK (t).
21See Footnote 7 for a definition of collinearity.
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combination p of elements of R(s) such that p≪ π(s). This implies the existence of a cyclic
subsequence s′′ of s such that π(s′′)= p, establishing the claim.
Suppose now that the converse holds: there is a cyclic subsequence s′′ of s such that
π(s′′)≪π(s). This implies R(s)> 1 and the same arguments as the above apply. 
Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose sequence s has a cycle. Consider two cases: (a) R(s)≤ 2, (b) R(s)≥ 3.
Case (a). If R(s)= 1, there is no subsequence s′ of s such that π(s′)≫π(s) and this violates
the assumption. If R(s) = 2, then either the elements of R(s) are not Pareto ranked, i.e.
R(s)= {u,u′} with u 6≫ u′ and u′ 6≫ u, in which case the assumption is violated because there
is no subsequence s′ of s such that π(s′)≫ π(s), or these elements are Pareto ranked. Say
u≫ u′ without loss of generality. Then the subsequence s′′ that always plays the action
profile yielding u is simpler than s (because it has a cycle of length 1) and gives each player
a strictly higher payoff than s.
Case (b). Suppose R(s) ≥ 3. If π(s) ∈ P (Co(R(s))), then there is no subsequence s′ of s
such that π(s′)≫π(s), which violates the assumption of the proposition. Therefore, assume
π(s) ∉P (Co(R(s))). Then there must be a triangle ∆=Co({u1,u2,u3}) such that (i) π(s) ∈∆,
(ii) {u1,u2,u3} ⊂ R(s), and (iii) π(s) ∉ P (∆). There are two sub-cases, depending on the
cardinality of N (∆).
Case (b1). Suppose |N (∆)| ≤ 2. This means that a vertex of ∆ is Pareto dominated.
Therefore, there exist u,u′ ∈ R(s) such that u′≫ u. Recall that sequence s has a cycle and
let a′ be the action profile played in the cycle for which u(a′)= u′. We construct subsequence
s′′ of s as follows: s′′ plays the same cycle as s, except that each time an action profile yielding
payoff u is played in the cycle of s, that profile is replaced with a′. Subsequence s′′ generates
a cycle whose length is smaller than or equal to that of s, and it satisfies π(s′′)≫π(s).
Case (b2). Suppose |N (∆)| = 3. Since s has a cycle, we can write π(s) as a convex combi-
nation of the elements played in its cycle
π(s)=
M∑
m=1
αm
ℓ
um
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where M ≥ 3, {um}⊂R(s), each αm ∈N\{0} and ℓ=
∑
αm is the length of the cycle of s. Recall
that π(s) ∈∆=Co({u1,u2,u3}). For any α∗ > 0, define
(5) π∗ =π(s)+
α∗
ℓ
((u2−u1)+ q(u2−u3))
and
(6) π∗∗ =π(s)+
α∗
ℓ
((u1−u2)+ q(u3−u2)),
where q ∈Q[0,1] is written as q= ν(q)/d(q). Since G is in family Fn, either (u
2−u1)+q(u2−
u3)≫ 0 and d(q)≤ n, or (u1−u2)+ q(u3−u2)≫ 0 and d(q)+ν(q)≤ n.22 Therefore, we know
that for all α∗ > 0, either π∗≫π(s) or π∗∗≫π(s) holds. We must verify that, in each case, we
can choose α∗ to obtain a well-defined convex combination. For α∗ =min{α1,α3}, (5) gives
π∗ =
∑
m 6=1,2,3
αmd(q)
ℓd(q)
um+
(α1−α
∗)d(q)
d(q)ℓ
u1+
α2d(q)+α
∗(ν(q)+d(q))
d(q)ℓ
u2+
α3d(q)−α
∗ν(q)
d(q)ℓ
u3,
which is a well-defined convex combination implementable by a sequence of length at most
d(q)ℓ≤ nℓ. For α∗ =α2/(1+ q), (6) gives
(7) π∗∗ =
∑
m 6=1,2,3
αm(d(q)+ν(q))
ℓ(d(q)+ν(q))
um+u1
(
α1(d(q)+ν(q))+d(q)α2
ℓ(d(q)+ν(q))
)
+u3
(
α3(d(q)+ν(q))+ν(q)α2
ℓ(d(q)+ν(q))
)
which is a well-defined convex combination implementable by a sequence of length at most
(d(q)+ν(q))ℓ≤ nℓ. 
Theorem 2
Proof. Take any π ∈ π(C (G)). Then there is a sequence s ∈C (G) such that π(s)=π. Sequence
s must be individually rational by Theorem 1, hence π ∈ ΠIR(G). By the same theorem,
s must also be internally efficient. Recall the definition of recurrent action profiles, (3).
If R∗(s) = {a} for some profile a, then π ∈ P (g) where g = {u(a)}. If R∗(s) = {a,a′}, then
internal efficiency implies π ∈P (g) where g =Co({u(a),u(a′)}). Suppose now that R∗(s)≥ 3.
22We actually know that either (u2−u1)+ q(u2−u3)≫ 0 and d(q)≤ k, or (u1−u2)+ q(u3−u2)≫ 0 and d(q)+
ν(q)≤ k, for some k≤ n.
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Every point in P (Co(R(s))), π in particular, must lie on the boundary of (i.e. a segment
in) Co(R(s)), for if π lied in the interior, then there would be a Pareto improvement over
π (and s would not be internally efficient). Since π must lie on a segment g ⊂ Co(R(s)), it
must be that π ∈ P (g). Now take any π ∈ (∪g∈L(G)P (g))∩Π
IR (G). We show that we can
build a sequence that satisfies both axioms and generates payoffs arbitrarily close to π. By
definition, there exist u1,u2 ∈Π(G) such that g = Co({u1,u2}) and π ∈P (g). If u1≫ u2 (or
vice versa), then P (g)= {u1}, hence the sequence that only plays the profile yielding payoff
u1 =π is internally efficient. If u1 and u2 are not Pareto ordered, then it is possible to build
a cyclic sequence s such that R(s) = {u1,u2} and whose payoff π(s) is arbitrarily close to π.
Such a sequence must be internally efficient, because π1 and u2 are not Pareto ordered and
s is cyclic. Thus, (∪g∈L(G)P (g))∩Π
IR(G) is included in the closure of π(C (G)). 
Proposition 3
Proof. Recall that for every π ∈ Co(R(s)), there is a rational convex combination
∑
k u
kαk,
where {uk}⊂R(s) and {αk}⊂Q, that is arbitrarily close to π. By way of contradiction, suppose
that sequence s satisfies the axioms but limT→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1 u(st) does not exist. Define
zT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(st).
By assumption, {zT } is divergent and since it lives in a compact space, it has at least two
(distinct) cluster points z′ and z′′ in Co(R(s)). By definition of the payoffs, z = (min{z′1, z
′′
1},
min{z′
2
, z′′
2
}) ≥ π(s). First, consider the case where {z′, z′′} 6⊂ P (Co(R(s))). Clearly z ∉ P (Co
(R(s))), and thus there is a cyclic subsequence s′ of s such that π(s′)≫ z. This violates Axiom
2. Second, consider the case where {z′, z′′}⊂P (Co(R(s))). Then there exist a,a′ ∈R∗(s) such
that u(a),u(a′) ∈ P (Co(R(s))), and both z′ and z′′ lie on the line segment u(a)u(a′). By
assumption, the stage game is such that no two distinct action profiles yield either player
the same payoff, u1(a) 6= u1(a
′) and u2(a) 6= u2(a
′). Therefore, z ∉ P (Co{R(s)}). There is a
rational convex combination yielding π≫ z, and thus there is a cyclic subsequence s′ of s
such that π(s′)=π. This is a violation of Axiom 2. 
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Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose first that there exists π∗ ∈Π(G) such that π∗≫ u(G)≥π for all π ∈Π(G)\{π∗}
and u(G) ∉Π(G). By Theorem 2, π(C (G)) ⊂ (∪g∈L(G)P (g))∩Π
IR(G). Since u(G) ∉Π(G) and
π∗≫ π for all π ∈Π(G)\{π∗}, the only segments g ∈ L(G) such that g∩ΠIR(G) 6= ; must be
such that π∗ ∈ g. For all segments g with π∗ ∈ g, we have P (g)= {π∗}. Therefore, π(C (G))⊂
{π∗}. Notice that the sequence that always plays the action profile a∗ with u(a∗) = π∗ is in
C (G). ThusC (G) is nonempty and π(C (G))= {π∗}. Suppose now that there is π∗ ∈Π(G) such
that π∗ ≥ u(G)≫ π for all π ∈Π(G)\{π∗}. If u(G) ∉Π(G), then π∗≫ π for all π ∈Π(G)\{π∗},
and the first argument of the proof applies. If u(G) ∈Π(G), then u(G) = π∗ by assumption,
so that L(G)∩ΠIR(G) = {π∗}. Applying Theorem 2 and building a sequence that always
produces payoff π∗ show that C (G) is nonempty. Hence π(C (G))= {π∗}. 
Proposition 5
Proof of Proposition 5. Take any renegotiation-proof equilibrium σ. Trivially, πi(σ) ≥ ui(G)
for all i, for otherwise some player would not be playing a best-response. By way of con-
tradiction, suppose that a(σ) violates Axiom 2. Then there exists a cyclic subsequence s′ of
a(σ) such that π(s′)≫π(a(σ)). We want to build a subgame-perfect equilibrium σ′ that has
s′ as its equilibrium path. Therefore, σ′ will satisfy R∗(a(σ′)) ⊂ R∗(a(σ)) and will Pareto
dominate σ. Since σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, for each player i there must be a
profile ai ∈ ∪hJ(a(σ|h)) such that maxai u i(ai,a
i
j
)≤ πi(a(σ)). If this were not the case, then
σi would not be a best-response to σ j because maxai u i(ai,σ j(h))> πi(a(σ)) for all h ∈ H.
23
Therefore, for each player i, there must be such a profile ai in ∪hJ(a(σ|h)). Of course this
implies u i(a
i)≤ πi(a(σ)) hence u i(a
i) < πi(a(σ
′)). From here, the proof will follow the equi-
librium construction from Rubinstein (1994) (Proposition 146.2, p. 147) and rely on one
critical observation. We construct a pair of automaton strategies that produces (the cycle of)
sequence s′ on its equilibrium path. We also specify the strategies of the players so that if
player i deviates from the equilibrium path, and thus deserves to be punished, then player
j plays ai
j
and player i responds by playing ai
i
. Any punishment begins in the period that
23Consider for example σˆi :H→ Si defined as σˆi(h) = br i (σ j(h)) for all h ∈H, the pointwise best-response to
σ j . Since ui(σˆi(h),σ j(h))>πi(a(σ)) for all h, then πi(a(σˆi,σ j))>πi(a(σ)).
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follows the completion of the cycle. A deviation is punished for enough periods to cancel out
any possible gain for the deviator, but then players return to the equilibrium path, starting
at the beginning of the cycle. As a result, after every possible history h, the payoff profile
from σ′|h, π(a(σ
′|h)), is equal to π(a(σ
′)). Thus, σ′ satisfies requirement (i) from Definition
6. The critical observation is that player i’s (repeated game) strategy is optimal, although
player i plays ai
i
in her punishment phase and ai
i
may not be a best-response to ai
j
. This
is because the punishment phase is finite and player i could not do better than πi(a(σ
′))
in the long-run by best-responding to ai
j
in the punishment phase. Since σ′ only uses a1
and a2 off-path, it is clear that ∪hJ(a(σ
′|h)) ⊂ ∪hJ(a(σ|h)). This is a contradiction of the
renegotiation-proofness of σ. 
Proposition 6
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof consists of three lemmas:
Lemma 1. If G ∈F1, then H(K ,G)⊂C (G) for every K ≥ 1 .
Proof. Take any sequence (at)∞
t=1
∈ H(K ,G) whose cycle is denoted by θ = (θ1, . . . ,θK ). Sup-
pose by way of contradiction that (at)∞
t=1
∉C (G). Since πi((a
t)∞
t=1
)≥ ui for all i by definition
of H(K ,G) (see (4)), it must be that there exists a cyclic subsequence s′ of (at)∞
t=1
such that
π(s′)≫ π((at)∞
t=1
). Since G ∈F1, Proposition 2 implies that there is a cyclic subsequence s
′′
of (at)∞
t=1
such that s′′ is simpler than (at)∞
t=1
and π(s′′)≫π((at)∞
t=1
). Letting θ′′ be the cycle of
s′′, we have π(θ′′)≫π(θ). Therefore, θ′′ is an internal improvement on a, a contradiction. 
Lemma 2. If G ∈Fn with n≥ 2, then limK→∞ dh(H(K ,G),C (G))= 0.
Proof. Take any sequence (at)∞
t=1
∈ H(K ,G) with cycle a = (a1, . . . ,aK ). Consider the set
Ra = {a
1, . . . ,aK }. Suppose first that P (Ra) has only one point (say a
1). Then it must be
that a= (a1, . . . ,a1), for otherwise a would have an internal improvement. Therefore there is
a time after which (at)∞
t=1
only plays a1, so (at)∞
t=1
∈C (G). Suppose now that P (Co(Ra)) has
at least two points. This implies that P (Co(Ra)) consists of Ma ≥ 1 segments (see Section V
for a definition). Let {gm}
Ma
m=1
be the set of segments such that ∪
Ma
m=1
gm =P (Ra). Take any
segment gm, cut it up into K pieces of equal length, and collect the K+1 extremities of those
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Segment g1 = a1a2 
Segment g2= a2a3 
a2 = u1
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u3
u4
a3 = u5
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FIGURE X. D(E2a) is the union of the white triangles along segment g2
K pieces into set Ema = {u
n}K+1
n=1
where the un’s are labeled in decreasing order w.r.t. their sec-
ond coordinate (See Figure X for an illustration where g2 is divided into K = 4 pieces). Each
element of Ema represents a payoff that can be generated by a finite sequence of action pro-
files with K elements from Ra.
24 For each u ∈Ema , consider the set of payoffs that are strictly
smaller than u: D(u)= {w ∈R2 :w1 < u1 andw2 < u2}. Let D(E
m
a )=Co(Ra)∩(∪
K+1
n=1
D(un))c —
c stands for complement — be the set of payoffs that are (strictly) undominated by any of
Ema ; Figure X depicts D(E
2
a). Using our labeling assumption, we have
sup
u∈D(Ema )
inf
w∈gm
||u−w|| = max
n=1,...,K
inf
w∈gm
||(un1 ,u
n+1
2 )−w||
= sup
w∈gm
inf
u∈D(Ema )
||u−w||,(8)
for each a ∈ AK with no internal improvement and segment gm ∈ P (Ra). This equation
simply says that the furthest point in D(Ema ) from gm must take the form (u
n
1
,un+1
2
); see
Figure X. For every m= 1, . . . ,Ma, it holds that
(9) lim
K→∞
max
n=1,...,K
inf
w∈gm
||(un1 ,u
n+1
2 )−w|| = 0.
Moreover it must be that π(a) ∈D(Ema ), for otherwise an alternative cycle of length K would
generate payoff un≫π(a) for some un ∈Ema . In that case, (a
t)∞
t=1
would not be in H(K ,G), a
contradiction. Therefore, π(a) and any payoff attached to a sequence in H(K ,G) must be in
24In Figure X, u4 can be generated by a cycle of length K = 4 by playing three times a3 and one time a2.
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some D(Ema ). It follows from (8) and (9) that D(E
m
a ) converges to gm ⊂C (G) for all m, and
thus limK→∞dh(H(K ,G),C (G))= 0. 
Lemma 3. Prob((at)∞
t=1
∈H(K ,G))= 1.
Proof. The process {a(nK )}∞
n=1
is a non-stationary Markov chain with set of states AK and
transition matrices {QnK
θ,θ′
}. Let φ : AK ։ AK be the correspondence that assigns to each
θ ∈ AK the set of internal improvements on θ. The set of states can be partitioned into three
sets: Θ1 denotes the set of states θ ∈ A
K for which there is i with πi(θ) < ui; Θ2 denotes
the set of states θ such that φ(θ) 6= ; and πi(θ) ≥ ui for all i; Θ
∗ consists of all the other
states, i.e. the states for which φ(θ) = ; and πi(θ) ≥ ui for all i. We will prove that under
Assumption 1,
(10) lim
n→∞
Prob
(
a(τK )= θ ∈Θ∗ for all τ≥ n
)
= 1.
Note that for all finite T,
Prob((at)∞t=1 ∈H(K ,G))=Prob((a
t)∞t=1 : (a
t)∞t=T ∈H(K ,G)),
and thus Prob((at)∞
t=1
∈ H(K ,G)) = 1 whenever equality (10) holds. Under the parameter
restrictions, the learning dynamic satisfies
(11) Prob(a((n+2)K )∈Θ∗|a(nK )∈Θ1)≥ ǫnKδ(n+1)K ,
(12) Prob(a((n+1)K )∈Θ∗|a(nK )∈Θ2)≥ δnK ,
and Prob(a((n+1)K )= θ|a(nK )= θ ∈Θ∗)≥µnK . According to Assumption 1,
lim
T→∞
∑
n>T
{
βnK
∏
T≤m<n
(1−βmK )
( ∏
ℓ≥n+1
µℓK
)}
= 1,
where βnK =min{δnK ,ǫnKδ(n+1)K }. Consider sequence {pn}where pn is the product
∏
ℓ≥n+1µℓK .
By way of contradiction, suppose that limn→∞ pn 6= 1. Since sequence {pn} is monotone,
limn→∞ pn 6= 1 implies the existence of b< 1 such that pn < b for all n. Then, for all T,
∑
n>T
{
βnK
∏
T≤m<n
(1−βmK )
( ∏
ℓ≥n+1
µℓK
)}
≤ b
∑
n>T
{
βnK
∏
T≤m<n
(1−βmK )
}
≤ b,
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which is in contradiction with Assumption 1. Thus, limn→∞ pn = 1. Define
A
n
T =
{
a(nK )= θ ∈Θ∗ and a(mK ) ∉Θ∗ for all T ≤m< n
}
to be the event that the stochastic process reaches Θ∗ at time nK for the first time since
TK . For large n, if the process reaches Θ∗, i.e. a(nK ) ∈Θ∗, then it never leaves it because
limn→∞ pn = 1. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
Prob
(
a(τK )= θ ∈Θ∗ for all τ≥ n
)
= lim
T→∞
Prob
(
∪n>TA
n
T
)
≥ lim
T→∞
∑
n>T
{
βnK
∏
T≤m<n
(1−βmK )
}
,(13)
where the inequality is a consequence of (11) and (12). The rhs of (13) is equal to 1 for
otherwise Assumption 1 would be violated given limn→∞ pn = 1. We conclude that (10)
holds. 
This completes the proof of Proposition 6. 
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